internal/store/sqlite.go:1177,1192,1221,1245 — the enrollment_tokens.token column holds the raw UUID token. ConsumeToken does WHERE token = ? against the raw string. Compare with operator_api_keys.key_hash, which is SHA-256 hex (constructed in internal/api/middleware.go:51-53).
Affected
All released versions up to v0.3.0.
Threat model
Read access to nebula-mgmt.db: backup, snapshot, file-system access, future SQL-injection sink. The principle of defense-in-depth: API keys are hashed at rest; enrollment tokens — which grant the same lifecycle authority over a host's identity — are not.
An attacker who reads the DB before a legitimate agent enrolls can consume the single-use token first, mint a cert against their own keypair, and take the agent's intended Nebula identity.
Suggested fix
- Schema migration: rename
enrollment_tokens.token → token_hash (or add the new column and drop the old after backfill of pending rows).
- Store SHA-256 of token on create:
sum := sha256.Sum256([]byte(token))
row.TokenHash = hex.EncodeToString(sum[:])
ConsumeToken accepts the raw token, hashes once, looks up by hash, atomically marks consumed.
Side bonus: take this opportunity to switch the token format from uuid.New().String() (122 bits) to hex.EncodeToString(crypto/rand 32 bytes) (256 bits), matching the project's session-token and API-key conventions. UUIDs are recognisable in logs and crash dumps; opaque hex blends in.
TOTP recovery codes appear to already be SHA-256 hashed at rest (internal/web/totp.go:74-78) — confirming that pattern is intentional elsewhere, just missed here.
References
internal/store/sqlite.go:1177,1192,1221,1245— theenrollment_tokens.tokencolumn holds the raw UUID token.ConsumeTokendoesWHERE token = ?against the raw string. Compare withoperator_api_keys.key_hash, which is SHA-256 hex (constructed ininternal/api/middleware.go:51-53).Affected
All released versions up to v0.3.0.
Threat model
Read access to
nebula-mgmt.db: backup, snapshot, file-system access, future SQL-injection sink. The principle of defense-in-depth: API keys are hashed at rest; enrollment tokens — which grant the same lifecycle authority over a host's identity — are not.An attacker who reads the DB before a legitimate agent enrolls can consume the single-use token first, mint a cert against their own keypair, and take the agent's intended Nebula identity.
Suggested fix
enrollment_tokens.token→token_hash(or add the new column and drop the old after backfill of pending rows).ConsumeTokenaccepts the raw token, hashes once, looks up by hash, atomically marks consumed.Side bonus: take this opportunity to switch the token format from
uuid.New().String()(122 bits) tohex.EncodeToString(crypto/rand 32 bytes)(256 bits), matching the project's session-token and API-key conventions. UUIDs are recognisable in logs and crash dumps; opaque hex blends in.TOTP recovery codes appear to already be SHA-256 hashed at rest (
internal/web/totp.go:74-78) — confirming that pattern is intentional elsewhere, just missed here.References